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In May 2001, the French National Assembly passed the so-called Lois Taubina
which retroactively decreed the colonial slave trade as a “crime against humanity”.
In 2019, Pope Francis publicly called trafficking in human beings a “crime against
humanity” whose commission would disfigure the victim as much as the perpetrator
himself. In the same year, the International Law Commission (ILC) presented its
final draft for a “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Humanity” that had been prepared by several hundred legal experts over ten years.
These are just some of the more prominent examples that illustrate how at the turn
to the 21st century “crimes against humanity” have developed into a global memory
site which oscillates between the spheres of law, politics, science, art and the media.
While a lively historical debate has emerged about the “birthplace” of the more
controversial genocide concept, the trajectory of “crimes against humanity” has
largely remained obscure. With the exception of a thought-provoking long essay
by Norman Geras who in 2001 discussed the concept within the domain of political
philosophy, legal historian Kerstin von Lingen is one of the first scholars to explore
its intellectual origins, conceptualization and practical ramifications in a longue durée
perspective.
Her monograph locates the concept’s point of entry in the middle of the “long” 19th
century, when a theoretical debate emerged on the containment of wartime violence
among legal circles of Western Europe and the United States. Both the reform
ideas of the Abolitionist movement as well as the first attempts of a codification
of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), reflected in the Lieber Code of 1863, the
Geneva Convention signed in the same year, and the two Hague Conferences of
1899 and 1907, were starting points of a new discourse centered around the victims
of military conflicts. In particular, the Martens clause of the Hague Convention
proved to be a decisive step on the path to a progressive “judicialization”. Not only
did it raise the concept of “humanity” from a moral to a political level, thereby paving
the way to the self-reflexive legal debates of the early 20th century. In spite of
their meagre results with respect to norm production, both conferences would also
become focal points of public engagement in the fields of war prevention and conflict
resolution. According to von Lingen, this aspect constituted a link to the various civil
society initiatives of the interwar period.
Too diverse or just diverse enough?
Von Lingen’s argument that IHL unfolded in three consecutive phases of
transformation (moral, political, legal) does not fully reflect the complexities of a
process of cumulation, by which different layers of meaning were inscribed in the
concept from the beginning, enabling its flexible use in changing contexts. Moreover,
given that the “humanity” discourse was also central to the identity debates of British
Liberal Imperialists, her investigation would have required a deeper engagement
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with this influential group of IL experts and their geopolitical visions. The new
“Empire” research, for instance, has made sufficiently clear that in this discourse
a selective view of the victims of war violence, preferably from the Balkans and
African countries, was consistently associated with “imagined geographies” of
“backwardness” and “anarchy” that could also serve as justification for military
interventions. Although it is plausible to argue that the codification efforts of the late
19th and early 20th century can also be read as catalysts of a self-representing
transnational public sphere, one should not overlook the great heterogeneity of
groups, positions and terms. Against this backdrop, it seems questionable whether,
for example, the “peace” talk of the International Women’s Federation can really
be placed in the same context of genesis as “crimes against humanity” (p. 127). As
recent studies on the progressivist peace movements have shown, these groups
pursued a comprehensive agenda of political, economic and social reform that sat
uneasily with the codifying practices and laissez-faire liberalism of international
elite lawyers. Because pacifists were concerned about the social inequalities and
exclusionary aspects of international security structures, their legal activism was
mainly focused on the projects of arbitration, the creation of a World Court and
disarmament.
Advantages of experiential history and a cross-cutting biographical
perspective
The book’s second part is devoted to developments since the beginning of the
Second World War. In line with current debates on the history of knowledge
production in the realm of the League of Nations, the author emphasizes the
connections between IHL discussions during the 1920s and the formation of an inter-
allied war crimes policy dealing with so-called “Axis Criminality”. The study focuses
on a small group of legal experts that so far have received only little scholarly
attention. Already before the St. James Conference of 1942, the British capital
had become a host for several exiled governments from Western and Eastern
European countries. Moreover, it turned into a hub of vibrant intellectual debates on
the updating of the laws of The Hague and Geneva which were no longer considered
sufficient in the face of Nazi mass violence committed against civilians in Central
Eastern and Eastern Europe.
Employing the lens of individual case studies, von Lingen’s book demonstrates
the advantages of experiential history and cross-cutting biographical approaches.
She draws our attention to a number of unknown scholars from Eastern Europe,
Austria and Germany who – though they do not appear in any of the grand narratives
of the Nuremberg IMT – understood themselves as the “avant-garde of modern
international law” (p. 223). This cohort of legal experts, most of them born in the
years between 1885 and 1895, was eager to resume a debate that had been
stalled since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Despite precarious living
conditions, language problems, and an unfavorable response by British politics and
public opinion that changed from indifference to hostility, they could draw on their
long-time professional experiences in order to provide important conceptual impulses
for the nascent international criminal law.
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Following the findings of Arieh Kochavi and Daniel Marc Segesser, von Lingen
points to the pivotal role of expert bodies such as the Cambridge Commission,
the London International Assembly and the UN War Crimes Commission. These
institutions pursued, at least on a theoretical level, the goal of continuing earlier
debates and transferring them into a new era, which was characterized by a
universalist understanding of human rights. In addition to European and European-
Jewish lawyers, there were also lawyers from the Soviet Union and China with
a professional background as legal advisors at the League of Nations who were
involved in these war-time discussions. Therefore, the work of these liberal
internationalists was crucial for the development of “crimes against humanity” as
an independent and innovative legal category already before 1945, as opposed to
the more traditional “war crimes”. As von Lingen rightly points out, not only those
codification efforts but also the concept’s initial definition disappeared into oblivion
after the end of the Nuremberg Trials, for several decades.
The (dis)continuities of a concept
As a reader, one would have liked to get some deeper insights into how the
protagonists positioned themselves towards overarching questions of the nascent
global sphere. Unfortunately, the author more than once gets stuck in the
reconstruction of highly specialized debates and legal-dogmatic particularities,
while neglecting to analyze important underlying processes such as decolonization
and the international refugee problem. The Holocaust forms a peculiar void in this
investigation. The author confines herself to the statement that the punishment of the
murder of the Jews was “not the original intention” of the exiled lawyers in London (p.
321). But apart from the fact that this assessment, in its sweeping nature, misses the
complex realities of perception patterns and opinion-forming, it also fails to answer
what motivated this restraint and to what extent we can speak of a development
towards a victim-centered understanding of international law, in spite of this glaring
omission.
These difficulties in finding an appropriate answer to this “breach in civilization”,
as Dan Diner has called it, do not diminish the historical significance of the legal
experts and their contribution to the modernization of IHL. For an adequate historical
interpretation, however, it must be taken into account that the decisive breakthrough
to a victim-centered international criminal law did not occur until two decades
later in the course of the highly mediatized Jerusalem Eichmann Trial. In this
respect, the protagonists’ continuous rhetorical references to the three pillars
of the famous Martens clause (“laws of civilized nations”, “laws of humanity”,
“public conscience”) did indeed represent a certain element of continuity in the
jurisprudential debates of the 19th and 20th centuries. From an analytical point
of view, however, it is more significant to look at the changing conjunctures of a
concept which underwent striking shifts in its meaning and whose later meteoric rise
was anything but predetermined.
 
An extended German version of this review will appear in print in the upcoming issue
of “Einsicht. Bulletin des Fritz Bauer Instituts”.
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